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1. Introduction 
In many countries no income tax is levied on the lowest earnings up to a certain 
level, a politically popular measure to help the poor. As income inequality rises, the 
threshold for tax exemption has recently been raised to £11,000 in the U.K. Though widely 
accepted, this measure is not supported by the existing tax literature, although increasing 
marginal taxes (IMT) are common in developed economies, usually in the form of piece-
wise linear tax systems. In this paper we argue that indeed minimum wage earners should 
be taxed at a lower rate than high earners. 
Income redistribution through progressive taxation appears more desirable as 
inequality has risen to record heights (Stiglitz, 2012; Piketty, 2014; Atkinson, 2015). As the 
proportion of low wage earners increases, so does the importance of setting appropriate tax 
rates for them to ensure work incentives and reduce inequality. However the literature 
provides little justification for uniformly IMT and there is no clear-cut result for the 
optimal tax structure. With subtle differences in social welfare and income distribution 
functions, the optimal marginal tax curves can be U-shaped (Diamond (1998), Saez 
(2001)), or inverse U-shaped (see Sadka (1976), Seade (1977), Tuomala (1984), 
Hindricks et al, 2006, Kanbur and Tuomala (1994), Boadway et al (2000), Tarkiainen 
and Tuomala (2007), Hashimzade and Myles (2007), Kaplow (2008) and see a good 
survey by Jacobs (2013))1. 
Although inverse U-shaped curves suggest lower taxes for the lowest earners, 
they also imply decreasing tax rates for top earners which are politically infeasible. This 
political concern and administrative costs may render the continuous tax curves “too far 
removed from the tax – benefit systems observed in practice to be a useful guide for 
                                                 
1 One exception is Aaberge and Colombino’s (2013) numerical simulation, based on Norwegian data, 
which yields the optimal IMT. Their result relies on declining elasticity of labour supply. 
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policy” (Choné and Laroque 2005, p.396). Diamond and Saez (2011) call for pragmatic 
research on tax policy. The opposite extreme to the continuous tax curve is a flat tax and 
the next step is two-band taxes. If we restrict tax rates to be non-decreasing on high 
income, an inverse U-shaped optimal tax curve might be reduced to increasing two-band 
taxes. Then one may expect IMT to be justified as a first approximation to the original 
optimal tax curve. 
In fact this is what Sheshinski (1989) initially found when he examined two-band 
taxes under utilitarian and maximin objectives. However Slemrod et al (1994) later 
showed that this is not correct and the optimal two-band taxes should be decreasing2. 
Salanie (2003), Hindricks and Myles (2006) obtain similar results in a simple two-class 
economy. Therefore lower taxes for minimum wage earners are not easily justified. 
Nonetheless, as we mentioned earlier, decreasing marginal taxes are often viewed as 
unfair and politically unacceptable. They also imply high marginal tax rates for the lowest 
income earners and the resulting poverty trap. In contrast a flat tax is politically more 
acceptable and by continuity it seems to be closer to the optimum than IMT. Hence 
Mankiw et al (2009) suggest that “A flat tax, with a universal lump-sum transfer, could 
be close to optimal”. It can save administrative costs and eliminate incentive distortions 
associated with progressive taxes. Several Eastern European countries have moved in 
this direction. Atkinson (1995) provides a comprehensive treatment of flat tax. Finally, 
but not least important, an optimal flat tax is easy to find. Piketty and Saez (2012) obtain 
the optimal flat tax given a general welfare function and realistic information, though 
they do not necessarily advocate its implementation3.  
                                                 
2
Boadway and Jacquet (2008) also show the optimal marginal tax curve is declining under maximin. 
3 They argue for a higher tax for top incomes (approximately the top 5%) based on decreasing marginal 
utility of income. Jacobs (2013) also argues against a flat tax for various reasons not discussed here. 
Formal proof that a flat tax is worse than IMT is presented in FitzRoy and Jin (2009), on parts of which 
this paper is based.  
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In contrast we argue that any flat tax is Pareto inferior to two-band taxes with a 
lower rate for minimum wage earners. This result seems to contradict the literature and 
suggests a non-monotonicity of the optimal tax structure. In a two-group example 
Slemrod et al (1994) graphically demonstrate that a flat tax can be worse than IMT for 
both groups. In other words, moving from a flat tax to IMT may be a Pareto improvement. 
This seems surprising to many economists. In his critique of radical income redistribution 
through taxation, Mankiw (2013) wrote: “As far as I know, no one has proposed any 
credible policy intervention to deal with rising inequality that will make everyone, 
including those at the very top, better off”. The example of Slemrod et al (1994) indicates 
that such a possibility may exist under a flat tax as advocated by Mankiw et al. (2009). 
This issue has not been further discussed in the literature.  
         This paper seeks to fill this gap and show that a Pareto improvement from a flat 
tax is not only possible, but arises under general conditions, including the most 
unfavourable assumption of identical elasticity of labour supply and marginal utility of 
income. We find that given an optimal flat tax under maximin it is always desirable to 
lower the tax rate for minimum wage earners. Moreover, given any optimal flat tax a tax 
reduction on minimum wage earners by their proportion in the population must be a 
Pareto improvement. This result also holds when there is voluntary and involuntary 
unemployment, or more than two tax bands.  
 The model is developed in the next section. Section 3 shows that lowering tax for 
minimum wage earners dominates the optimal flat tax under maximin. In Section 4 we 
demonstrate that such a simple tax reduction can benefit everyone. Section 5 concludes 
and proofs are in appendices. 
2. The Model 
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 We assume that a population, normalized to unity, consists of a continuum of 
households, whose wage is denoted by w, and is distributed on [a, b], where 0 < a < b, 
and a represents the minimum wage. The wage distribution follows cumulative and 
density functions F(w) and f(w). A household’s pre-tax earnings y are proportional to its 
wage w and labour supply x, i.e., y = wx. The government observes earnings and imposes 
two tax rates, t1 and t2, when earnings are below or above a threshold y . If one’s earnings 
do not exceed y , his after-tax earnings are wx(1 t1). Otherwise they are wx(1 t2) + 
y (t2 t1). The tax revenue is equally distributed as a basic income B to everyone, after 
a fixed public expenditure P is paid. The unemployed are not included in the unit 
population and their welfare will be discussed in Section 5. 
 We assume everyone’s utility function is m – x/(1 +1/), where m is income 
and  is the elasticity of labour supply. Similar utility functions are used in the literature 
(e.g. Atkinson 1995, Boadway and Jacquet 2008). Our identical elasticity of labour 
supply for the entire population is obviously less favourable for IMT than empirically 
plausible declining elasticity, used by Aaberge and Colombino (2013).  
 Given t1, t2 and y , the utility function for different earners can be written as: 
  V1 = wx(1 t1) – 
1 1/ ε
1 1/
x



 + B   for wx  y   (1) 
  V2 = wx(1  t2) + y (t2  t1) – 
1 1/ ε
1 1/
x



 + B for wx > y   (2) 
 Every household chooses its labour supply to maximize its utility. When t1 < t2, 
we define w1 and w2 by (1 – t1)w1 = y  and (1 – t2)w2 = y . Then households can be 
divided into three groups. Those with w  w1 will choose labour supply x = w(1 t1). 
Those with w > w2 choose x = w(1 t2). The remaining ones with w1 < w  w2 choose 
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x = y /w and just earn y , i.e., bunching. The tax revenues generated from these three 
groups are t1(1 – t1) 
1 )(1
w
a
dwwfw  , t2(1 – t2) 

b
w
dwwfw
2
)(1   – (t2  t1)[1 – F(w2)] y
and t1 y 
2
1
)(
w
w
dwwf  respectively. So the total tax revenue is equal to: 
      R = t1(1 – t1) 
1 )(1
w
a
dwwfw   + t2(1 – t2) 

b
w
dwwfw
2
)(1   +  
 {t1[1 – F(w1)] – t2[1 – F(w2)]} y       (3)
 We assume the fixed public expenditure P is less than the revenue, so it does not 
affect our tax decision and the basic income B can be treated as R (minus P). We 
substitute the optimal labour supply w(1 t1) into the utility function (1), and let w = a, 
to obtain the utility of minimum wage earners as the maximin objective function.  
  u = 




1
1a
 (1 – t1) + B                                                                 (4) 
 Under a maximin objective, we maximize the utility of minimum wage earners. 
We assume F(a) > 0, so minimum wage earners have a positive mass and the maximin 
is a reasonable social objective. Also part time employees often earn less than full time 
minimum wage earners. Combining them together we have a significant fraction F(a) in 
most countries. In UK and USA for instance, this fraction is approximately 20% and 30% 
respectively4. As minimum wages rise in these countries, so will the proportion of 
minimum wage earners and the importance of the relevant tax policy. In the next section 
we show the optimal flat tax under maximin is always inferior to two-band IMT.  
                                                 
4 In UK the minimum wage was £6.08 per hour in 2011, implying annual earnings of £12,000, exceeding 
20% British income (http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/statistics/tax-statistics/table2-4.pdf). The US average 
minimum wage is about $7.5/hour, or annual earnings $15,000, more than 30% Americans’ 2010 income 
(http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/cpstables/032011/perinc/new01_001.htm, 2010"). 
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3. Maximin  
 To justify a lower tax for minimum wage earners, we first find the optimal flat 
tax under maximin. Piketty and Saez (2012) find an optimal flat tax under a general 
welfare function, which is a weighted sum of individual welfare. It has a simple form of 
(1 – g )/(1 +  – g ), where the elasticity of aggregate earnings  is equivalent to our 
individual elasticity of labour supply, and g  is the ratio of the average income weighted 
by individual social welfare weights to the average income of the population.  
 When t1 = t2, the tax revenue in (3) reduces to t(1 – t) 

b
a
dwwfw )(1  . For 
simplicity, we let E ≡ 

b
a
dwwfw )(1  , where the integral includes the mass at a. So E is 
the total and also average earnings of the population without tax. Then we can write the 
maximin objective function (4) as a(1 – t)/(1 + ) + t(1 – t)E. Its first-order 
derivative with respect to t is (1 – t){[1 – (1 + )t]E – a(1 – t)}, which is positive if 
and only if t is smaller than the expression t* given below. Hence we obtain the optimal 
flat tax under maximin. 
Proposition 1: The optimal flat tax under maximin is t* =


 



1
1
)1( aE
aE
.  
 The result is a special case of Piketty and Saez (2012), where a/E represents 
their g  as all the social welfare weight is given to minimum wage earners (they use actual 
earnings, but the ratio is same under flat tax). The optimal flat tax t* falls with a/E as 
the gap between the poor and rich is smaller, and falls with  as a higher elasticity implies 
more efficiency loss due to taxation.  
The next question is whether lowering tax for minimum wage earners can make 
them better off than the optimal flat tax. The answer seems to be “no” from the existing 
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literature. With low productivity, minimum wage earners may not gain very much from 
a lower tax, but lose more in basic income B due to the loss of tax revenue from the rest 
of the population. However we can show that minimum wage earners can always benefit 
from a lower tax rate below the optimal tax t*.  
It suffices to show this is true when we let the threshold income y = a(1 – t1). 
It ensures that minimum wage earners do not face the high tax when choosing optimal 
labour supply. Given y = a(1 – t1) and our definition of w1 implies w1 = a. The only 
people facing the low tax and not bunching are minimum wage earners. If t2 > t1, we have 
w2 > a. Starting from t*, if we lower t1, both y  and w2 increase. Individuals with w 
between a and w2 will be bunching, earning just y . We can show that when t1 = t2 = t*, 
u/t1 < 0 (see Appendix A). Hence there always exist some IMT with t1 < t2 = t*, that 
give a higher value of (4), i.e. benefit minimum wage earners.  
Proposition 2: Given y = a(1 – t1), lowering t1 below the optimal flat tax t* 
benefit minimum wage earners.  
Thus the optimal flat tax under maximin is dominated by two-band IMT with a 
lower tax for minimum wage earners. Realistically, however, the government is 
concerned not only with the wellbeing of minimum wage earners, but also the society as 
a whole. The maximin optimal flat tax t* is not the one advocated by Mankiw et al. 
(2009). To justify lower tax for minimum wage earners, we need to compare it with an 
optimal flat tax in a more general sense and use a more robust criterion to demonstrate 
its superiority. In the next section we will show that starting from any optimal flat tax, a 
lower tax rate for minimum wage earners can make everyone better off. 
4. Pareto dominance  
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 The maximin objective is not politically feasible, so the question is whether some 
tax reduction for minimum wage earners can make everyone better off than under a flat 
tax. If so, we would have a strong case for such a tax reduction. We will show that 
reduction of t1 is indeed a Pareto improvement over any flat tax. The flat tax need not be 
t*, but any optimal tax under a general social welfare function.  
 We follow Piketty and Saez (2012) to construct a general social welfare function. 
Let s(w) (≥ 0) be the social welfare weight attached to households with wage w, subject 
to 
b
a
dwwfws )()(  = 1. Following (1) and (2), under a flat tax t, a household’s net utility 
is u(w) = w(1 – t)/(1 + ) + B, where B is equal to t(1 – t)E – P. Hence the general 
social welfare function can be written as  
 
b
a
dwwfwuws )()()(  = 



 
1
)1( 1t


b
a
dwwfwsw )()(1   + t(1 – t)E – P  (5) 
  As we mentioned earlier, our elasticity of labour supply plays the same role as 
the elasticity of aggregate earnings in Piketty and Saez (2012). Differentiating the welfare 
function (5) with respect to t, we see that its value increases with tax rate t if and only if 
t < [E – 

b
a
dwwfwsw )()(1  ]/[(1 + )E – 

b
a
dwwfwsw )()(1  ], which is the optimal flat 
tax. Letting 

b
a
dwwfwsw )()(1  /E ≡ g , the optimal tax maximizing (5) can be written in 
the same form as in Piketty and Saez (2012): 
Proposition 3: The general optimal flat tax tˆ =
g
g


1
1
.  
 The welfare weight s(w) should be non-increasing with w. If s(w) = 1, we have 
the utilitarian welfare function. Thus g = 1 and the optimal flat tax is zero. If s(w) = 0 
except for w = a, we have g = a/E, tˆ  becomes the previous optimal flat tax t* under 
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maximin. In general the value of g  lies between 1 and a/E, and tˆ  is between zero and 
t*. Conversely, any flat tax within this range can be viewed as an optimal tax under a 
certain social welfare function associated with a non-increasing social welfare weight 
function s(w). Given a general optimal flat tax tˆ , we show that a tax reduction for 
minimum wage earners can provide a Pareto improvement. 
 We already know that a reduction in t1 benefits minimum wage earners. Then we 
consider the next income group, i.e. individuals with wage between a and w2. They only 
work up to the threshold earnings y  = a(1 – t1), i.e. bunching. Their labour supply is 
a(1 – t1)/w. When t1 falls, they pay a lower tax rate and gain from increased labour 
supply due to a higher y . Substituting these variables into (1), we get their utility 
function.  
U1 = a(1 t1) – 

 


1
1a
(
w
a
)(1 – t1)+ B   (6) 
Finally we consider high income earners with w > w2. Their labour supply is not 
affected by t1. When t1 falls and y  = a(1 – t1) rises, they will benefit from a lower 
infra-marginal tax rate and a higher tax threshold y . Substituting y  = a
(1 – t1) into 
(2), we can write their utility function as: 
  U2 = 




1
1w
(1  t2) + a(t2  t1)(1 – t1) + B   (7) 
 Differentiating (6) and (7) with respect to t1, we find that both derivatives are 
negative when t1 = t2 = tˆ (see Appendix B). Hence (6) and (7) rise when t1 falls and we 
have a Pareto improvement over the optimal flat tax tˆ .   
 Proposition 4: Lowering t1 is a Pareto improvement over the optimal flat tax tˆ . 
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 Our result generalize the insight from the example of Slemrod et al (1994) that 
any flat tax is Pareto inferior to some IMT. This outcome depends on the assumption of 
F(a) > 0, i.e. a positive mass of minimum wage earners. This may seem surprising, but 
the intuitive explanation is straightforward. When we lower the tax rate for minimum 
wage earners, the high income group will not change their labour supply. The other two 
groups, the bunching group and minimum wage earners, will increase their labour supply, 
which is a(1 – t1)/w and a(1 t1)respectively. Everyone benefits from a lower tax 
but receives less income transfer, i.e. the basic income B. If minimum wage earners have 
a positive mass, their increased labour supply will increase the total output, which ensures 
the total benefit exceeds the reduction in tax revenue. As everyone benefits at least from 
a tax reduction of y t1, and loses an equal amount of basic income, no one can be worse 
off. This intuitive argument applies not only in our model with a specific utility function, 
but also in the general case.  
 Although everyone benefit from such a tax reduction, they may not benefit 
equally. One may expect that minimum wage earners benefit the most since they are the 
main target of tax reduction. This is not necessarily true as higher wage earners also pay 
less tax even though they may not adjust their labour supply very much. In fact, if we 
compare the derivatives of the utility respect to t1 in Appendices A and B, it is easy to 
see that U1/t1 < u/t1 always and U2/t1 < u/t1 given t1 < t2. Hence these two groups 
will benefit more than minimum wage earners do when t1 falls.  
 Proposition 5: Higher income earners benefit more from the tax reduction on 
minimum wage earners. 
 This should reduce any political resistance against the tax reduction. This finding 
can be compared with Sadka (1976), and Seade (1977), who show that the tax rate on the 
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top earnings should be zero. While the zero tax rate only applies to one individual in their 
case, our tax reduction should be applied to a positive mass, and thus can bring in a 
significant improvement. 
 So far we have only shown the positive impact of a marginal tax reduction for 
minimum wage earners. Generally this impact may change when the tax reduction 
becomes significant. For a practical policy recommendation, it is desirable to know if 
this positive effect can be sustained for a discrete change in the tax rate. Hence we will 
show that this is guaranteed for a tax reduction by the amount of F(a) tˆ . 
 We first consider the impact of a reduction in t1 by F(a) tˆ  on minimum wage 
earners. In Appendix A when we keep t2 = tˆ  and let t1 fall from tˆ to [1 – F(a)] tˆ , (A3) 
implies that u/t1 = m(1 – t1) tˆ [F(w2) – F(a)] < 0. So u rises as t1 falls, and minimum 
wage earners are better off with the tax reduction. Similarly, the derivatives of U1 and U2 
respect to t1 are both negative when t1 falls from tˆ  to [1 – F(a)] tˆ . Hence (6) and (7) must 
rise when t1 falls by F(a) tˆ . Therefore we obtain: 
 Proposition 6: Reducing the tax rate on minimum wage earners from the optimal 
flat tax tˆ by F(a) tˆ  is guaranteed to be a Pareto improvement.  
 Our finding leads to a simple policy recommendation: the tax rate on minimum 
wage earners should be lower than the next tax rate by a proportion of F(a), which is 
their proportion in the population. The group, including minimum wage earners and most 
part-timers, is roughly 20% in the UK (2011) and 30% in the USA (2010). Their full time 
earnings are roughly £12,000 and $15,000, with marginal tax rates 20% (on income from 
£11,000 to £35,000) and 15% (up to $34,000) respectively. In the UK, national insurance 
contributions of 12% on incomes over £8,000 raise the effective tax rate to 32% on 
income over £11,000. Our result suggests that everyone will be better off if the tax rates 
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up to £12,000 and $15,000 fall to 16% and 10.5%. Tax reduction of F(a) tˆ  is not the limit 
for a Pareto improvement. Even though a further reduction may not benefit everyone, it 
can be a Pareto improvement over the flat tax. In addition to the positive effect on 
employment, we may justify zero tax for low income earners, such as the income-tax free 
allowance of £11,000 in U.K.  
 We see from the proof that the Pareto improving tax reduction needs not be from 
the optimal tax tˆ , but any flat tax. Furthermore, it may also be from any multi-band taxes. 
We may assume that beyond y , there are other income thresholds, above which other tax 
rates apply. Then the tax revenue R in (3) remains the same except for the third term, t2(1 
– t2) 

b
w
dwwfw
2
)(1  becomes multiple integrations with different tax bands. However 
these new terms will not be affected by t1. So when we calculate B/t1, the result remains 
the same. Hence the tax reduction for minimum wage earners is still Pareto improving 
under a general multi-band tax system. 
 Finally we argue that the tax reduction for minimum wage earners remains a 
Pareto improvement when there is unemployment, either voluntary or not. So far we have 
not explicitly considered unemployment, while the fixed public expenditure may include 
the unemployment benefit. If the unemployment is involuntary, the tax reduction will not 
affect it. The voluntarily unemployed may choose to work after the tax reduction. Given 
the same unemployment benefit and a Pareto improvement for all employed, when the 
unemployment falls, the extra tax revenue can be used to increase the unemployment 
benefit. So the tax reduction is still a Pareto improvement.  
5. Conclusions 
 Our results suggest that lowering the tax rate for minimum wage earners always 
dominates any flat tax under maximin. Moreover a tax reduction for minimum wage 
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earners can benefit everyone, and hence can be justified under any social welfare 
function. This result seems intuitive but to the best of our knowledge it has not been 
reported in the literature. Of course our results depend on a basic income, quite different 
from existing benefit systems, and income taxes are generally progressive. However, 
there is growing interest in basic income, often in conjunction with a flat tax. Perhaps of 
more relevance, total (direct and indirect) average tax paid in the UK is a roughly similar 
percentage of gross income across the distribution.  
 The welfare gain from the tax reduction may be small in our model, but is likely 
to be greater in more realistic cases. For instance we do not consider decreasing marginal 
utility of income as Piketty and Saez (2012) do, which provides further social justification 
for progressive taxes. Also, differing from Aaberge and Columbino (2013), we assume 
an identical elasticity of labour supply for the entire population. In reality its value for 
full-time and high income earners is much lower than that for low income earners. This 
means less efficiency loss due to taxation on high earners. In particular, we do not 
consider the crucial participation decision of low income earners, which generates the 
‘poverty trap’ under high implicit marginal tax rates as benefits are phased out. A lower 
tax for minimum wage earners will reduce the disincentives to work, and generate 
potentially more wealth for the society. These factors may further justify the tax 
reduction, but are omitted from our tax model for simplicity and tractability. Tax 
reduction for low earners and its impact become more significant with a large F(a), which 
has increased in many developed countries after the recent financial crisis and provides 
additional support for tax reform. 
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Appendix A, Proof of Proposition 2:  
Starting from t*, we show u/t1 < 0. Given t1 ≤ t2 = t*and y  = a(1 – t1), i.e., w1 = a, 
(3) implies the tax revenue can be written as:  
 R = t1(1 – t1)a + t2(1 – t2) 

b
w
dwwfw
2
)(1   – t2(1 – t1)a[1 – F(w2)]   (A1) 
As w 12 (1 – t2)
 = a(1 – t1), we have R/w2 = –t2(1 – t2) w
1
2 f(w2) + t2(1 – t1)
a 
f(w2) = 0. So we ignore indirect impacts via w2 when differentiate R with respect to t1.
 
1t
B


= (1 – t1)a{1 – (1 + )t1 + t2[1 – F(w2)]}    (A2) 
 We substitute these results when differentiating u in (4) and obtain  
 
1t
u


= (1 – t1)a{t2[1 – F(w2)] – t1}       (A3) 
 When t2 = t1 = t*, u/t1 < 0 as t2F(w2) = t*F(a) > 0.  
Appendix B, Proof of Proposition 4: 
We first differentiate (6) with respect to t1, and get 
1
1
t
U


 = –a(1 – t1)[1 +   
w
a
)] + 
1t
B


    (B1) 
 Substituting B/t1 in (A2) into (B1), we obtain 
1
1
t
U


 = –a(1 – t1){(1  
w
a
))(1 – t1) + t1 – t2[1 – F(w2)]}  (B2) 
When t2 = t1 = tˆ , (B2) is negative if [1 – (a/w)](1 – tˆ ) + tˆ F(a) > 0. As a < w, this 
inequality holds. So U1 must rise as t1 falls. Differentiating (7) with respect to t1 we get 
 
1
2
t
U


 = – a(1 – t1)[1 – t1 + (t2 – t1)] + 
1t
B


    
(B3) 
Plugging (A2) into (B3), we obtain U2/t1 = –a(1 – t1)t2F(w2) < 0.   
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